In-Depth Analysis· un security council reform the world is bigger than five turkiye

Why Türkiye Says 'The World Is Bigger Than Five': The 1945 Order and the Case for UN Security Council Reform

Why Türkiye says 'the world is bigger than five': how the 1945 Security Council order works, the veto, G4 vs Uniting for Consensus, and Ankara's reform case.

TSC

By The Short Century Editorial Team

Published: October 27, 2026

⏱ 10 min read (1,995 words)

Executive Summary & Key Facts

The UN Security Council still runs on a 1945 formula: five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States) with a veto, in a UN that has grown from 51 to 193 members.
The Council's only enlargement came in 1965, when it grew from 11 to 15 members; the five permanent seats and the veto were left untouched.
Türkiye's slogan 'The world is bigger than five' (Dünya beşten büyüktür) argues that no group of five states can speak for the international community on peace and security.
Türkiye belongs to the Uniting for Consensus group, which opposes new permanent seats and favours more elected, longer-term and re-electable seats.
Any Charter amendment needs ratification by two-thirds of members including all five permanent members, so the P5 effectively hold a veto over reform of the veto itself.

Why It Matters

The UN Security Council still operates on a formula agreed in 1945: five permanent members hold a veto, while the UN has grown from 51 founding members to 193. Türkiye argues, under the slogan 'The world is bigger than five' (Dünya beşten büyüktür), that this design is neither representative nor reliably effective, especially when vetoes stall action on Ukraine and Gaza. Almost every state agrees the Council needs change. They disagree on what kind, and the Charter gives the five permanent members a veto over any amendment.

Background

A 1945 settlement frozen in the Charter

The Council's structure comes from wartime diplomacy: the Dumbarton Oaks talks (1944), the Yalta voting formula (February 1945) and the San Francisco Conference. The UN Charter was signed on 26 June 1945 and entered into force on 24 October 1945. Under Article 23, China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States were named permanent members. Six other members were to be elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. Article 24 gives the Council primary responsibility for international peace and security, Article 25 makes its decisions binding, and Article 27(3) requires the concurring votes of the permanent members on substantive matters. That requirement is the veto.

This is the world of the 'short century' in institutional form. The order of 1945 grew out of the wars and collapses of 1914–1945 and was then carried through the Cold War largely unchanged. For the wider framework, see What Was the 'Short Century'? Reading Türkiye's Crises Through 1914–1991 and After and The Short Century: Today's Crises Read Through the Long Arc of 1914–1991.

Key milestones

Date	Event
26 June 1945	UN Charter signed in San Francisco; Türkiye is among the original signatories
24 October 1945	Charter enters into force; Council seats fixed at 5 permanent and 6 elected
3 November 1950	General Assembly adopts 'Uniting for Peace' (Resolution 377 (V)) after Cold War deadlock over Korea
17 December 1963	General Assembly adopts the amendment enlarging the Council (Resolution 1991 (XVIII))
31 August 1965	Enlargement takes effect: 15 members, 10 of them elected
2008	Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) on Council reform begin in the General Assembly
25 February 2022	Russia vetoes a draft resolution on Ukraine
26 April 2022	General Assembly Resolution 76/262 requires a debate after any veto
22 September 2024	Pact for the Future commits states to Council reform, including better African representation

The 1965 enlargement is the only time the Council has changed size. Fifteen seats for 193 states is roughly 7.8 percent of the membership, against about 21.6 percent (11 of 51) in 1945. Elected seats are allocated by region: three for Africa, two for Asia-Pacific, one for Eastern Europe, two for Latin America and the Caribbean, and two for the Western European and Others Group. Türkiye sits in the last group.

Why the veto cannot easily be amended

Under Articles 108 and 109, a Charter amendment needs a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of members, including all five permanent members. In practice every permanent member holds a veto over reform.

Paralysis in Ukraine and Gaza

Ukraine. On 25 February 2022, Russia vetoed a draft resolution on the invasion of Ukraine; China, India and the UAE abstained. The General Assembly then adopted resolution ES-11/1 on 2 March 2022 with 141 votes in favour. On 26 April 2022 it adopted Resolution 76/262, which requires a General Assembly debate within ten working days of any veto. That was a procedural response to a Council that could not act.

Gaza. The United States vetoed draft resolutions on 18 October 2023, 8 December 2023 and 20 February 2024. Washington said among other things that certain texts did not recognise Israel's right to self-defence or could undermine diplomacy. On 27 October 2023 the General Assembly called for a humanitarian truce with 120 votes in favour. On 25 March 2024 the Council adopted Resolution 2728, demanding a ceasefire for the month of Ramadan, with the US abstaining. For Türkiye's role in this file, see Gaza and the Century-Long Palestine Question: Where Türkiye's Humanitarian Diplomacy Fits.

The point is not limited to one permanent member. The Council has been blocked by Russia and China on some files and by the United States on others, which is why reform arguments cut across political camps.

Key Players & Positions

The permanent five

United States: In 2022 President Biden told the General Assembly that Washington supports increasing the number of permanent and non-permanent members. In September 2024 the US ambassador to the UN said Washington backs two permanent seats for Africa without veto rights, plus a rotating seat for small island developing states. The US has not endorsed extending the veto.
United Kingdom and France: Both support new permanent seats for Brazil, Germany, India and Japan and for African representation. France also promotes voluntary restraint on the veto in mass-atrocity situations, jointly with Mexico. The ACT Group's 2015 Code of Conduct has a similar aim.
Russia and China: Both say they favour greater representation of developing countries, particularly in Africa. They resist deadlines and any text-based process that lacks broad consensus, and neither has abandoned its veto.

Competing reform blocs

Proposal	Who	Core idea	Main objection
G4	Brazil, Germany, India, Japan	New permanent seats for themselves and for Africa, plus additional elected seats; its 2005 draft offered to defer new members' veto for 15 years	Critics say it entrenches a new tier of privilege
Uniting for Consensus (UfC)	Includes Italy, Pakistan, Mexico, Egypt, Spain, Türkiye, Argentina, Canada, South Korea	No new permanent seats; more elected seats, longer terms and re-election possible	Critics say it does not answer demands for permanent status from Africa or the G4
African Group	African Union	Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration: two permanent seats with full veto and five additional elected seats for Africa	P5 resist extending the veto; wider agreement is lacking

The Intergovernmental Negotiations have run since 2008. They still lack a single negotiating text that all sides accept, which is why observers describe the process as long-running but unfinished.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Treaties, Archives & Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position: The Historical and Legal Position

Türkiye was an original UN member and served on the Council as an elected member, most recently in 2009–2010. Its reform case rests on the following points, as stated in Presidency and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) material.

'The world is bigger than five.' President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has used this formulation repeatedly, including in addresses to the UN General Assembly. Ankara argues that a body charged with acting on behalf of all members under Article 24(1) should reflect the membership of 193 states. Readers should consult the official transcripts on the Presidency and Directorate of Communications websites for the exact wording of each speech.
Structural, not cosmetic, reform. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Türkiye wants a Council that is more representative, transparent, accountable and effective. It is a member of Uniting for Consensus and opposes creating new permanent seats, arguing that they would deepen rather than reduce inequality. Ankara favours more elected seats with longer terms and the possibility of re-election, and says the veto should be limited.
Sovereign equality as the legal basis. Article 2(1) of the Charter states that the UN is founded on the sovereign equality of all its members. Ankara reads the permanent-member privilege of 1945 as a wartime arrangement that has outlived its justification. It does not accept it as a permanent entitlement.
Paralysis has costs. Turkish officials have said that a veto exercised for political reasons leaves civilians unprotected. Ankara combines this critique with practical diplomacy outside the Council: the 2022 Istanbul talks and the Black Sea Grain Initiative, and humanitarian diplomacy on Gaza. It also co-chairs the Friends of Mediation group with Finland, launched in 2010. See Istanbul Talks and the Grain Corridor: Can Mediation Break the Century's Conflict Cycle? and Montreux at Ninety: How the 1936 Straits Convention Still Holds the Black Sea Balance.
Council decisions have long consequences. Ankara points to Resolution 186 of 4 March 1964 on Cyprus. It argues that by treating the Greek Cypriot administration as 'the Government of Cyprus', after the 1963 collapse of the bi-communal order, the Council created a status asymmetry that has outlasted its original context. See Cyprus as a Cold War Legacy: Reading 1960, 1963, 1974 and 1983 as One Continuous Story.

To be fair to critics: some analysts say that a UfC-style approach also leaves the existing permanent members in place, and that Türkiye has its own interest in a larger group of elected seats. Ankara answers that renewable, accountable seats give all regions a stronger voice, whereas new permanent seats would simply extend the 1945 design.

Source Comparison

Question	Common international framing	Turkish primary sources	Editorial note
Why reform?	Council reflects 1945 power; Africa and Latin America underrepresented	Same diagnosis, framed as a matter of sovereign equality (Charter Art. 2(1))	Broad agreement on the diagnosis
Is the veto the core problem?	Some focus on seats, others on limiting the veto	MFA and Presidency stress the veto and paralysis alongside membership	Veto reform needs P5 consent under Art. 108
New permanent seats?	G4 and Africa argue for them	Türkiye opposes them as UfC member	The central dividing line among reformers
Gaza and Ukraine	Often described as proof of dysfunction	Cited as evidence that 'five' cannot represent the world	Both sides cite the same events
Likelihood of change	Frequently described as remote	Ankara keeps pressing, citing the Pact for the Future	Most analysts note the P5 veto over amendment

For sister-publication analysis, see Region Scope: 'The World Is Bigger Than Five': Türkiye's Case for UN Security Council Reform and The Political Anatomy: Türkiye's UN Security Council Reform Case and COP31 Climate Diplomacy. A further view is in Polity Review: 'The World Is Bigger Than Five'. For the source standards applied here, see Editorial Principles: How The Short Century Handles Sources, Positions and Corrections.

P5: the five permanent members of the Security Council: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Veto: the power of a permanent member to block a substantive draft resolution by casting a negative vote (Charter Art. 27(3)). Abstention does not block adoption.
G4: Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, who jointly seek permanent seats.
Uniting for Consensus (UfC): a group of mid-sized states that opposes new permanent seats; Türkiye is a member.
Ezulwini Consensus: the African Union's common position of 2005, demanding two permanent seats with veto rights and five elected seats for Africa.
IGN: Intergovernmental Negotiations, the General Assembly's reform process since 2008.
Uniting for Peace (Res. 377 (V)): the 1950 mechanism that lets the General Assembly act when the Council is deadlocked.

The Short Century presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. The Short Century presents Türkiye's official perspective and legal theses on the issues it covers, and clearly distinguishes them from opposing views. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, state archives, and official statements. Published by the The Short Century Editorial Team.

Frequently asked questions

What does 'The world is bigger than five' mean?

It is President Erdoğan's formulation that five states cannot speak for the whole international community on peace and security. It expresses Türkiye's case for a Security Council that is more representative, transparent, accountable and effective. The slogan is *Dünya beşten büyüktür* in Turkish.

Why does the Security Council have five permanent members?

The five were the principal victors of the Second World War and were named in the UN Charter of 1945: China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. Article 27(3) gave them a veto over substantive decisions. The Council was enlarged from 11 to 15 members in 1965, but the permanent seats and the veto did not change.

Does Türkiye want a permanent seat?

No. As a member of Uniting for Consensus, Türkiye opposes adding new permanent seats. It argues for more elected seats with longer terms, the possibility of re-election, and limits on the veto. Its position is stated in Turkish MFA and Presidency material.

What are the main competing reform proposals?

The G4 (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan) seeks new permanent seats for itself and for Africa. Uniting for Consensus rejects new permanent seats in favour of more elected seats. The African Union's Ezulwini Consensus demands two permanent seats with veto rights and five more elected seats for Africa.

Why is reform so hard to achieve?

A Charter amendment needs a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of members including all five permanent members (Articles 108–109). Each permanent member can therefore block reform. Regional rivalries over who should receive any new seats add a second obstacle.

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